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I. INTRODUCTION
As of this writing, drone strikes have become a critical tool in the War on
1
2
Terror. Used regularly in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Pakistan, they have

* Kristina Benson, PhD candidate in Islamic Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. This
paper benefitted tremendously from the comments and input of Assistant Professor Aslı Ü Bâli, and the support
of Professor Emerita Sondra Hale, and Distinguished Professor Khaled Abou el Fadl. Sincere appreciation to
UCLA School of Law, who generously permitted my use of their facilities, and to the staff at The Globe, who
went above and beyond the call of duty in helping prepare this article for publication.
1. Drones, REPRIEVE, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/investigations/drones/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013);
Drone Strikes Kill, Maim and Traumatize Too Many Civilians, U.S. Study Says, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/
2012/09/25/world/asia/pakistan-us-drone-strikes/index.html?iref=allsearch (last updated Sept. 25, 2012, 8:33
PM).
2. Cora Currier, Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 5, 2013, 10:50
AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-drone-strikes.
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3

additionally carried out occasional missions in the Philippines, Iraq, Libya, and
4
Somalia, and have even been occasionally used in U.S. airspace to provide
5
surveillance functions on domestic populations. Although the drone program
remains officially classified, a mix of on-the-ground reporting, eye-witness
accounts, and leaked information allow us to make tentative assessments of the
legality of signature drone strike protocol, both in theory and as it has been
executed. The head of the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) developed
“signature strikes,” and the CIA made critical decisions about the development
and use of the drone program during President George W. Bush’s second
6
presidential term. Such strikes target individuals due solely to their observed
7
pattern of behavior, or “signature,” and have been deployed with the most
frequency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (“FATA”) of Pakistan,
8
Yemen, and Afghanistan.
In spite of President Obama’s insistence that such strikes do not cause a
9
“huge number of civilian casualties,” there is mounting evidence that signature
strike protocol does a poor job of distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants, resulting in a disproportionate amount of civilian casualties and the
10
infliction of grave psychological trauma on civilians in a given strike zone.
Clive Stafford Smith, director of the anti-drone activist group Reprieve, put it as
follows, “[a]n entire region [of Pakistan] is being terrorized by the constant threat
of death from the skies . . . Their way of life is collapsing: kids are too terrified to
go to school, adults are afraid to attend weddings, funerals, business meetings, or
11
anything that involves gathering in groups.”

3. Akbar Ahmed & Frankie Martin, Deadly Drone Strike on Muslims in the Southern Philippines (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/03/05-drones-philippines-ahmed.
4. Currier, supra note 2.
5. Ryan Gallagher, FBI Fesses Up: We’ve Used Domestic Drones 10 Times, SLATE (July 26, 2013, 4:37
PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/07/26/fbi_admits_in_letter_to_rand_paul_that_it_s_used_
domestic_drones_10_times.html.
6. Adam Entous et al., U.S. Tightens Drone Rules, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 4, 2011), http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204621904577013982672973836.
7. Greg Miller, At CIA, a Convert to Islam Leads the Terrorism Hunt, WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-03-24/world/35447818_1_cia-officials-robert-grenier-ctc [hereinafter
At CIA]; Greg Miller, White House Approves Broader Yemen Drone Campaign, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2012),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-04-25/world/35452363_1_signature-strikes-drone-strikes-qaeda
[hereinafter White House approves].
8. See generally INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT RESOLUTION CTR. (STAN. L. SCH.) & GLOBAL
JUSTICE CLINIC (N.Y.U. SCH. OF L.), LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS
FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN, (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf [hereinafter LIVING UNDER DRONES].
9. Chris Woods et al., Emerging from the Shadows: US Covert Drone Strikes in 2012, BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/emerging-fromthe-shadows-us-covert-drone-strikes-in-2012-2/.
10. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1.
11. Id.
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This Article will use on-the-ground, eyewitness reports, recently leaked
12
Justice Department legal analysis, and HELLFIRE missiles’ specifications and
testing data to explore the legality of signature strikes under International
Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) insofar as the principles of distinction and
proportionality are concerned. Additionally, it will interrogate claims that drone
technology itself is inherently less likely to lead to civilian casualties due to
claims of drones’ accuracy and precision, as well as assertions that U.S. drone
pilots are unburdened by the psychological stresses that normally accompany
“traditional” military operations.
This Article will begin with a short history of the use of drones in the global
war on terror, before confirming that IHL applies where signature strikes have
13
been most frequently used. The sections that follow will discuss signature strike
14
protocol and its usefulness as a proxy for direct participation in combat, and
15
then move on to an assessment of proportionality. After addressing arguments
that drone technology inherently distinguishes and minimizes the danger of
disproportionally, the final sections will discuss the relevance of IHL in a post16
9/11 world. Finally, the Article will conclude with a discussion of the
ramifications of signature drones strikes, both for local populations and for
17
American strategic objectives.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY: SIGNATURE STRIKES AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Sources generally trace the birth of the drone program to 2000, when the CIA
began flying unstaffed drones over Afghanistan to support military surveillance
18
operations. Some reports indicate that the first drone strike was a joint effort
between the CIA and the military, when an armed drone was sent after six
19
terrorist suspects in Yemen on November 3, 2002. Lieutenant General Michael
DeLong, watching a video feed at Centcom headquarters in Tampa, called then
12. According to Boeing, the HELLFIRE missile (initially named the Helicopter Launched Fire and
Forget missile), “is a short-range, laser or radar-guided, air-to-ground missile system designed to defeat tanks
and other individual targets, while minimizing the exposure of the launch vehicle to enemy fire. It was designed
during the 1970s as a multimission, anti-armour, precision attack weapon that would be effective against tanks,
bunkers and structures. Advanced development of the missile continued through 1976, when the U.S. Army
awarded an engineering contract to Rockwell International.” History: AMG-114 HELLFIRE Missile, BOEING,
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/bna/hellfire.page (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part V.
15. See infra Part VI.
16. See infra Part VII.
17. See infra Part VIII.
18. John Sifton, A Brief History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.thenation.
com/article/166124/brief-history-drones#.
19. Chris Woods, ‘OK, Fine. Shoot him.’ Four Words That Heralded a Decade of Secret US Drone
Killings, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Nov. 3, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
2012/11/03/ok-fine-shoot-him-four-words-that-heralded-a-decade-of-secret-us-drone-killings/.
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CIA Director George Tenet, and together, they decided to fire. “Tenet goes,
‘[y]ou going to make the call?’ And [DeLong] said, ‘I’ll make the call.’ [Tenet]
says, ‘[t]his SUV over here is the one that has Ali in it.’ [DeLong] said, ‘OK,
20
fine.’ You know, ‘[s]hoot him.’ They lined it up and shot it.”
Eight thousand miles away, the drone fired, killing a U.S. citizen along with
21
22
the five other men in the SUV. One of these men, the intended target, was
Qa’id Salim Sinan al-Harithi, an Al-Qaeda affiliate accused of orchestrating the
23
attack on the USS Cole. Al-Harethi had not been on the FBI’s twenty-two mostwanted terrorist fugitive list at the time of his death, and although investigators
had wanted to question him about the USS Cole bombing, law enforcement
24
officials were not consulted before the strike was carried out.
According to other sources, however, the first use of armed drones occurred
in February of 2002, when a CIA-operated drone spotted a “tall man” around
25
whom others were “acting with reverence.” As in the Yemeni operation, the
strike against the tall man was run entirely by the CIA, absent any pretext of
26
support for a military mission. “A decision was made to fire the Hellfire
missile,” at the target, although the identity of the person or organization making
27
this decision still remains unclear. But the “tall man” was not Osama bin
28
Laden. Reporters who traveled to the site of the strike learned that he was a
local named Daraz Khan, who at 5’11” was tall compared to other Afghans, but
29
“six inches shorter than bin Laden.” Daraz Khan died along with two others,
30
neither of whom were alleged terrorists. Military officials insisted nonetheless
31
that the target had been “legitimate.”
Towards the end of President Bush’s second term, “Roger,” a code name for
32
the person heading the drone program, argued that the CIA should launch
attacks based solely on an individual’s observed “pattern of behavior” or
33
“signature.” President Bush agreed, and the frequency of CIA-operated drone

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Sifton, supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. At CIA, supra note 7.
33. Id.; Azmat Khan, The Covert Convert Behind the CIA’s Drone Program (Mar. 26, 2012, 2:02 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/secret-war/the-covert-convert-behind-the-ciasdrone-program/.
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34

strikes increased dramatically. Upon taking office, however, President Obama
35
expressed reservations about the use of “signature strikes.” One advisor
reportedly told him:
“Mr. President, we can see that there are a lot of military-age males
down there, men associated with terrorist activity, but we don’t
necessarily know who they are.” Obama reacted sharply, “[t]hat’s not
good enough for me.” According to one adviser describing the
president’s unease: “He would squirm . . . he didn’t like the idea of kill
36
‘em and sort it out later.”
Like other controversial counterterrorism policies the Obama administration
inherited, “signature strikes” did end up “good enough,” and President Obama
overcame his initial discomfort to eventually become an enthusiastic supporter of
37
the drone program. In 2009, he organized the drone program into fourteen drone
“orbits,” each consisting of three drones providing constant surveillance over the
38
tribal areas of Pakistan. Strikes increased, and whereas the Bush administration
ordered one drone strike over Pakistan in all of 2004, the Obama administration
39
was ordering a strike every four days when the program was at peak usage, with
40
fifty-three strikes in 2009 and 117 in 2010.
By 2011, drones had logged approximately 2.7 million hours of flight time
41
and completed over 80,000 missions. Strikes in Pakistan killed more than 1,500
42
people between 2009 and 2011 alone, and Pakistani officials, along with
American diplomats and military personnel, complained that the relationship
43
between the two countries was incurring damage as a result. Strikes in Pakistan
had become so frequent in fact, that the U.S. military found itself in the unusual
position of urging the CIA to use restraint, complaining that the CIA launched
44
attacks even during high-level diplomatic exchanges with Pakistan. The CIA

34. Entous et al., supra note 6.
35. Micah Zenko, Targeted Killing and Signature Strikes, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (July 16, 2012),
http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/.
36. Id.
37. Entous et al., supra note 6.
38. Id.
39. Woods, supra note 19.
40. Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Pakistan Ends Drone Strikes in Blow to U.S. War on Terror, BLOOMBERG
(Mar. 12, 2012, 7:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-13/pakistan-tells-white-house-to-stopdrone-missions-after-disputes-fray-ties.html.
41. Thomas M. McDonnell, Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to Carry Out
Assassinations or Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 248
(2012).
42. Entous et al., supra note 6.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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was urged to “be more selective,” particularly with Osama bin Laden dead and
45
Pakistan demanding an end to signature strikes.
In response, the Obama administration launched a review that led to minor
changes in the program: the State Department would participate more heavily in
strike decisions, Pakistan would be given advance notice of drone strikes on a
more regular basis, and the CIA would agree to suspend operations when
46
Pakistani officials visited the United States The name of the program was also
47
changed from “signature strike” to TADS. According to Daniel Klaidman of the
Council on Foreign Relations:
[S]ignature strike has gotten to be, you know, sort of a pejorative term.
They sometimes call it crowd killing. And it makes a lot of people
uncomfortable . . . So the CIA actually changed the name of signature
strikes to something called TADS . . . . I had the acronym but I didn’t
know what it stood for . . . eventually I figured it out. It was [sic] terrorist
attack disruption strike. And I was going to put it in . . . Newsweek. And
actually it was the excerpt from my book. And various agencies from the
government were very unhappy about that. And I sort of could not
understand why . . . they said, well, it’s a classified term. And I said,
well, why would it be classified? It doesn’t make any sense. It’s just a
term to describe . . . . a particular kind of activity that we know takes
place . . . they asked me not to print it . . . You know, I printed it
48
anyway.
The name change to TADS did not reflect a profound structural policy shift
49
and was not accompanied by a reduction in the use of signature strikes. In the
first ten days of 2013, there were seven drone strikes in Pakistan alone, which
50
killed at least forty people, and in January of that year, President Obama
announced that he wanted John Brennan, a key architect of the drone program, to
51
head the CIA. The drone program, therefore, has a considerable fan base and
plenty of proponents within the Obama Administration, in the media, and in

45. Id.
46. Id.
47. David E. Sanger et al., Views from the Newsroom: Challenges to American Power, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (June 22, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/audio-video/david-sanger-anddaniel-klaidman-on-national-security.
48. Id.
49. Spencer Ackerman, U.S. Drones Pound Pakistan, Which Responds by Doing Exactly Nothing, WIRED
(Jan. 10, 2013, 12:45 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/01/pakistan-drone-war/; Peter Bergen &
Jennifer Rowland, John Brennan, Obama’s Drone Warrior, CNN (Jan. 9, 2013, 8:39 AM), http://www.
cnn.com/2013/01/07/opinion/bergen-brennan-drones.
50. Ackerman, supra note 49.
51. Bergen & Rowland, supra note 49.
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academia. This article will consider pro-drone arguments in a later section, but
first, it will confirm that IHL, otherwise known as the laws of war, applies where
signature strikes are deployed.
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: WHEN IT APPLIES, AND WHAT IT
MEANS IN A POST-9/11 WORLD
As per the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”)’s Tádic decision, the threshold for determining that a non-international
armed conflict (“NIAC”) is at hand breaks down into two elements: “(a) the
53
intensity of the violence and (b) the organization of the parties.” Both must be
54
“evaluated on a case-by-case basis by weighing up a host of indicative data.”
Protocol II excludes:
situations of internal disturbances and tensions . . . and other acts of a
similar nature . . . Relevant factors that contribute to an armed conflict
include: intensity; number of active participants . . . duration and
protracted character of the violence; organization and discipline of the
parties; capacity to respect IHL; collective, open, and coordinated
character of the hostilities; direct involvement of governmental armed
force . . . and de facto authority by the non-state actor over potential
55
victims.
Therefore, the section below will confirm that conflicts are at hand where
signature strikes are used, it will then discuss what this means under international
law.
A. Yemen
In considering the criteria of threshold and intensity of the conflict in Yemen,
this article will limit its analysis to the drone strikes and joint operations between
Yemeni and American authorities that began in 2009.
The Washington Post reported in early 2010 that “U.S. military teams and
intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with Yemeni
troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people, among them six of
fifteen top leaders of a regional Al-Qaeda affiliate, according to senior

52. See generally id.
53. Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and
Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 72 (2009).
54. Id.
55. Marco Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, 6 HPCR
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 1, 6 (2006).
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56

administration officials.” The Post also reported, “American advisers are acting
as intermediaries between the Yemeni forces and hundreds of U.S. military and
intelligence officers . . . the combined efforts have resulted in more than two
57
dozen ground raids and airstrikes [in Yemen].” The New York Times
corroborated the existence of such raids, and characterized American operations
in Yemen as part of a “shadow war” involving American personnel, cruise
58
missiles, and fighter jets.
Signature strikes were approved for use in Yemen in 2011, and drones are
currently launched with the consent of the Yemeni government from the U.S.
59
Africa Command, a military base in Djibouti. Some claim that drones are only
used in Yemen “when there is clear indication of the presence of an Al-Qaeda
leader or [alternatively] of plotting against targets in the United States or
60
Americans overseas.” Others, like The Wall Street Journal, concluded the
th
opposite, reporting on April 25 , 2012 that the administration had relaxed
circumstances wherein signature strikes could be used, approving signature lite
61
for Yemen.
State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh gave a speech to the American
Society of International Law in early 2010 in which he expressed agreement with
the view that “the United States is in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as
62
the Taliban, and associated forces.” Additionally he stated that the United States
was permitted to “use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense
63
under international law.” Finally, he said that attacks must also conform to “law
of war principles” including those of distinction and proportionality; however,
64
this final issue will be addressed in later sections.
Given the frequency of drone strikes and other military operations against
Al-Qaeda in the tribal areas of Yemen for nearly two years, there can be little
65
doubt that U.S. activities in Yemen rise to the level of an armed conflict. The
56. Dana Priest, U.S. Military Teams, Intelligence Deeply Involved in Aiding Yemen on Drone Strikes,
WASH. POST, (Jan. 27, 2010), at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/01/26/AR2010012604239.html.
57. Id.
58. Scott Shane et al., Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 14,
2010), at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/15shadowwar.html?pagewanted=all.
59. Currier, supra note 2; Susan Breau et al., Discussion Paper 2: Drone Attacks, International Law, and the
Recording of Civilian Casualties of Armed Conflict, OXFORD RESEARCH GROUP 1, 1 (June 2011), available at
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/ORG%20Drone%20Attacks%20and%20
International%20Law%20Report.pdf.
60. White House Approves, supra note 7.
61. See id.
62. Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the American Society for
International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010). 104
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 207, 218 (2010).
63. Id.
64. Id. See Parts IV-VI.
65. See Priest, supra note 56; see also Vité, supra note 53, at 72.
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fact that these activities are at the invitation of the Yemeni government, or at the
66
very least occur with its permission, renders the conflict non-international.
B. Pakistan
In theory, Pakistan and the United States are allies, and although there is
some discomfort with the frequency and intensity of drone strikes in the tribal
region of Pakistan, there have been cases wherein certain attacks have been
67
praised, if not celebrated, by Pakistani officials. The “tribal” region, to be clear,
68
refers to the FATA, on the Pakistan side of the Durand line. After Pakistan
gained its independence from the British Empire in 1947, this area was officially
left to the management of local tribes in keeping with the British system, wherein
the tribes were held “collectively responsible” for maintaining security in the
69
territory. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, FATA
became a sort of a sanctuary for Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as a
hotbed of political (and sometimes military) activity directed against the Pakistan
70
government by disenchanted Pashtun youths. Therefore, a common argument is
71
that FATA is an “ungoverned territory” outside of Pakistani control. But some
Pakistani officials see things differently, and “all leading political parties in
Pakistan declared” in a December 2010 statement that drone strikes in this region
72
“compromis[e] the sovereignty of Pakistan.”
Even so, the Pakistan government has assisted the U.S. government in the
execution of these sovereignty-compromising drone strikes, occasionally
claiming that “militants,” rather than U.S. drones, have been responsible for
73
civilian deaths in spite of evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the intended
targets of the CIA drone program in Pakistan are Al-Qaeda operatives, their
74
affiliates, members of the Taliban, and those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
This conflict, it should be noted, has also been characterized as “part and parcel
75
of the Non-International Armed Conflict in Afghanistan.”

66. See Priest, supra note 56; see also Vité, supra note 53, at 72.
67. Shuja Nawaz, Drone Attacks Inside Pakistan: Wayang or Willing Suspension of Disbelief?,12 GEO. J.
INT’L AFF. 79, 80 (2011), available at http://journal.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/Drone-Attacks-InsidePakistan-Wayang-or-Willing-Suspension-of-Disbelief.pdf.
68. The Durand Line refers to the Pakistan-Afghan border, which was drawn in 1893 by the British
government. For more information, see Jayshree Bajoria, The Troubled Afghan-Pakistani Border, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/troubled-afghan-pakistani-border/p14905.
69. Nawaz, supra note 67, at 81.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 82-83.
72. Id. at 84.
73. See generally Drones, supra note 1.
74. Koh, supra note 62, at 218.
75. Breau et al., supra note 59, at 1.
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This conflict also rises without question to the level of an armed conflict set
forth by Tádic, given that drone strikes killed 2,562-3,325 people in Pakistan
76
between 2004 and 2012. There is also some indication that American troops and
helicopters are stationed in Pakistan, though the official position is that they are
there to conduct civil affairs-related training at the invitation of the Pakistan
77
government.
Although drone strikes have tapered from their peak usage in 2010, residents
of the northwest tribal region of Pakistan hear drones flying twenty-four hours
per day, seven days per week, and report living with the fear that they could be
78
struck at any moment. “Signature strikes make up a significant proportion of”
79
drone strikes in Pakistan, and show no sign of abating. As the targets of drone
strikes are non-state, transnational armed groups, and as drone strikes only take
place with the approval of local officials, a non-international armed conflict is
taking place in Pakistan.
C. Afghanistan
80

As of this writing, the conflict in Afghanistan is entering its eleventh year.
Although President Obama has promised a drawdown from Afghanistan and a
near-complete reduction in ground troops by 2014, drone strikes have been
81
occurring at an accelerated rate. In 2012, thirty-three drone strikes per month
were being carried out in Afghanistan, compared to twenty-four and a half per
82
month in 2011, and a recently leaked Justice Department White Paper, likely
written around the time that a drone strike killed American citizen Anwar alAwlaki in Afghanistan, refers repeatedly to “applicable laws of war principles”
83
and to th e conflict as “non-international.” Indeed, as Afghanistan drone strikes
take place with the permission of the Afghan government and are “ordered by a

76. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1.
77. Noah Shachtman, 3 GIs Killed in Pakistan. Now Can We Start Treating This Like a Real War?
(Updated Once More), WIRED (Feb. 3, 2010, 10:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/danger room/2010/02/3-giskilled-in-pakistan-when-do-we-start-treating-this-like-a-real-war/.
78. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1.
79. CENT. FOR CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT & COLUMBIA LAW SCH. HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, THE CIVILIAN
IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 9 (2012), available at http://web.law.
columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/The%20Civilian%20Impact%20of%20
Drones.pdf. [hereinafter CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES].
80. Noah Shachtman, Military Stats Reveal Epicenter of U.S. Drone War, WIRED (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:00
AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/11/drones-afghan-air-war/.
81. See id.
82. Id.
83. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LEGAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN
WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1, 3, available at
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
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local commander, overseen by military lawyers,” the ICRC agrees with the
85
Justice Department’s assessment that the conflict is non-international.
IV. IHL APPLIES TO SIGNATURE STRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN,
YEMEN, AND PAKISTAN
Given that IHL applies in Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, each party is
bound to apply at minimum the fundamental provisions contained in Article 3
common to all four Geneva Conventions, which are further developed in the
Geneva Protocol II of 1977. Both Common Article 3 and Geneva Protocol II
apply with equal force to all parties in an armed conflict, government and
86
transnational armed groups alike. The rules of customary international law as
well as the basic principles of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality
87
similarly apply, given that IHL is in play. Article 52, section 1 and section 2 of
Protocol I of 1977 authorizes armed attacks only if they are directed towards
88
military objectives, and grants general protection to civilian objects. Although a
number of states (including the United States) are not party to the Additional
Protocol, this general principle of distinction is widely recognized as binding
customary international law, meaning that states that have not signed the treaty
89
are bound to the aspects recognized as customary.
It is, of course, tempting to conclude that IHL, while technically applicable,
has become irrelevant in the post-9/11 world, given that the enemy is a
transnational armed group rather than a nation state. But this is difficult to
reconcile with the fact that Common Article 3 anticipated the existence of such
groups and clearly applies to conflicts with them, even if these groups are
90
themselves not parties to relevant treaties.

84. Shachman, supra note 80.
85. Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INT’L REV.
OF THE RED CROSS 47, 51 (2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/ 2011/irrc-881-bellalgiacca-casey-maslen.pdf.
86. Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 states, “[i]n addition to the provisions which
shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.” For
analysis and more information, see ICRC, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW? 1 (March 2008), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
87. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW, VOL. 1: RULES XXXV (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
88. See ICRC, supra note 86, at 2.
89. For a discussion of applications for Customary International Law see Customary International
Humanitarian Law, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law/
overview-customary-law.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
90. Bellal et al., supra note 85, at 55.
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According to the ICRC:
To what extent Common Article 3 directly addresses [armed non-state
actors, or “ANSAs”] has been debated. The article states that ‘each Party
to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum’ its provisions. It
has sometimes been claimed that the term ‘each Party’ does not apply to
ANSAs, even though they may meet the criteria for being a party to the
conflict, but only to government armed forces. State practice,
international case law, and scholarship, have, however, confirmed that
Common Article 3 applies to such ANSAs directly. . . Suffice to
acknowledge that, although the legal reasoning to sustain this conclusion
remains unsettled, it has now become uncontroversial, even
‘commonplace,’ [sic] that ANSAs are bound by international
91
humanitarian law.
Additionally, a resolution adopted in 1970 by the UN Assembly speaks of
92
combatants in all armed conflicts, suggesting that attacks on transnational
armed groups are still subject to the principles of distinction. The language of
Article 51(3) is fairly succinct, stating: “civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
93
hostilities.”
This is not to say that there are no reputable figures arguing that the rise of
transnational armed groups has “discredited” literal or conservative readings of
94
various aspects of International Humanitarian Law. Indeed, on February 10,
2003, Professor Rüdiger Wolfrum, Director of the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law, stated that international law was
95
in a period of “transition.” Wolfrum referred to a “reformulation” of selfdefense concepts that impacted the “legitimacy” of the use of force, both in the
96
realms of jus in bello and jus ad bellum.
However, at the World Summit of 2005, the Charter rules were reconfirmed
as written, with the Summit Outcome document bereft of any new rules on the
97
use of force contrary to those in the Charter. Furthermore, the Charter and its
attendant legal framework has been used by Bush-Cheney and the Obama

91. Id. at 55-56.
92. Practice Relating to Rule 6. Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule6 (last visited July 26, 2013).
93. Id.
94. William K. Lietzau, Old Law, New Wars: Jus Ad Bellum in the Age of Terrorism, 8 MAX PLANCK
Y.B. OF U.N. L. 384, 399 (2004).
95. Id. at 386.
96. Id.
97. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Drones Under International Law, WASH. UNIV. L. INT’L DEBATE SERIES 585,
590 (2010).
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administration as a source of authority that legitimates the right to self-defense,
making it difficult to conclude that the UN Charter has become irrelevant.
President Obama and his supporters, in fact, have used essentially the same
arguments as Bush-Cheney, contending that that the United States is “in armed
conflict with Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in response to the 9/11
attacks, and we may also use force consistent with [the] inherent right of national
99
self-defense.” John Brennan, a top counter-terrorism adviser to the Obama
administration, to this end, claimed:
There is nothing in international law that bans the use of remotely piloted
aircraft for [the above] purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal
force against our enemies outside of an active battlefield, at least when
the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to take action
100
against the threat.
Finally, the recently leaked Justice Department White Paper refers repeatedly
to “laws of war principles” and “international law” throughout and was likely
101
written in 2010. It is thus possible to conclude that the United States
government still regards international law, the laws of war, and IHL as sources of
authority.
The ongoing use of IHL as a source of legitimacy, both in private and public
102
government communications about the global war on terror, makes it difficult
to conclude that IHL is irrelevant in a post 9/11 world. This Article will now turn
to a discussion of “signature strikes” and whether they are an appropriate proxy
for “direct participation” as defined by IHL. If so, it can be concluded that the
principle of distinction is respected by signature strike protocol. If not, the
legality of signature strike protocol may be in doubt.
V. SIGNATURE STRIKES AND “OBSERVED PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR:” A LEGAL
(OR USEFUL) PROXY FOR “DIRECT PARTICIPATION?”
The theory behind signature strikes is that an individual’s pattern of
behavior—or “signature”—serves as a proxy for determining if that individual

98. See, e.g., Legal Advisor William H. Taft IV’s Remarks Regarding the Use of Force Under
International Law, given Oct. 27, 2004, which repeatedly invokes the U.N. Charter’s right of self-defense and
its applicability to September 11th, available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2004/78298.htm. See generally Koh,
supra note 62. For the Obama administration’s reliance on the U.N. Charter and its attendant legal framework to
justify the use of drones and the use of force in Yemen and elsewhere, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note
83, at 3.
99. Stephanie Kennedy, Top Aide To Barack Obama Pleads the Case for the Use of Drones, ABC NEWS
(May 1, 2012), http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/content/2012/s3492761.htm.
100. Id.
101. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 4.
102. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 99.
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either has a continuous combat function (making the individual a lawful
combatant) or alternatively, is directly participating in the conflict (possibly
103
making that individual an unlawful combatant). If the individual is a
combatant, lawful or otherwise, the use of lethal force is generally appropriate
104
under international law. “Direct participation” in hostilities, according to IHL,
occurs when a given act fulfills the following cumulative criteria:
1. The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or
military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to
inflict death, injury, or destruction on persons or objects protected
against direct attack (threshold of harm), and
2. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military
operation of which that act constitutes an integral part (direct
causation), and
3. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required
threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the
105
detriment of another (belligerent nexus).
Activities that meet the necessary “threshold of harm” might include:
Capturing, wounding or killing military personnel; damaging military
objects; or restricting or disturbing military deployment, logistics and
communication, for example through sabotage, erecting road blocks or
interrupting the power supply of radar stations. Interfering electronically
with military computer networks (computer network attacks) and
transmitting tactical targeting intelligence for a specific attack are also
examples. The use of time-delayed weapons such as mines or boobytraps, remote-controlled weapon systems such as unmanned aircraft, also
“directly” causes harm to the enemy and, therefore, amounts to direct
106
participation in hostilities.
Alternatively, a given activity could fall under the category of “indirect”
107
participation. These types of activities, which fail to meet the necessary

103. See Practice Relating to Rule 6, supra note 92.
104. See Id.
105. NILS MELZER, ICRC, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN
HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 20 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/icrc-002-0990.pdf.
106. Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions and Answers, ICRC RESOURCE CENTRE (Feb. 6,
2009), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm.
107. Id.
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threshold of harm, are indirect participation because they contribute to the
general war effort of the party but “[do] not directly cause harm and, therefore,
108
[do] not necessarily lead to a loss of protection against direct attack.” This
includes the production and shipment of helmets for military personnel, “the
construction of roads and other infrastructure, and financial, administrative and
109
political support for military bodies.”
Direct participants and persons with continuous combat function may be
attacked at any time under IHL: while planning military operations, while
engaging in active hostilities, or even when they are on their way to the barracks
110
from the battlefield. Civilians, on the other hand, are regarded as impermissible
military targets, and traditionally, have been negatively defined as individuals
111
who are not directly participating in hostilities. Specific acts may be considered
“direct participation” in conflict even if they are not likely to adversely affect the
112
military operations or military capacity of a party to the conflict. Absent
military harm, however, such acts must at the very least be likely to cause death,
113
injury, or destruction.
Signature strike protocol, however, does not map onto the definition of direct
participation or continuous combat function under IHL. Comments by CIA and
White House officials indicate that drone strike operators may be instructed to
assume all military-aged men in a strike zone are “combatants” unless there is
explicit intelligence proving that the men do not have a continuous combat
114
function, or are not directly participating in hostilities. In the aforementioned
leaked Justice Department White Paper, the Administration argued for an
expanded definition of “imminent” danger, contending that an individual’s mere
membership in Al-Qaeda would be enough for exposure to the legal use of lethal
115
force. Additionally, the administration claims that defining the scope of “direct
participation” in this manner allows the United States to “avoid broader harm to
116
civilians and civilian objects.” Counterterrorism officials have furthermore
insisted that a person in an area of known terrorist activity or in the presence of a
top Al-Qaeda operative is most likely up to no good and thus a suitable target for
a signature strike: “Al-Qaeda is an insular, paranoid organization—innocent
neighbors don’t hitchhike rides in the back of trucks headed for the border with
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id.
See MELZER, supra note 105, at 16.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Chris Woods, Analysis: Obama Embraced Redefinition of ‘Civilian’ in Drone Wars, BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (May 29, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/05/29/analysis-howobama-changed-definition-of-civilian-in-secret-drone-wars/.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 8.
116. Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101,
121 (2011).
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guns and bombs,” one official told the New York times on condition of
117
anonymity.
Acting on these sorts of assumptions, however, may be against international
law. Even in the context of the War on Terror, actors do not become a legitimate
target due to official membership status in a terrorist organization, nor through
118
their physical association with members of a terrorist organization. Actors
become legitimate targets due to their role in the organization as determined by
119
actual activities. In other words, a man may have lunch with a member of AlQaeda, attend prayers with him, attend a community meeting with him, or ride
120
with him in the same pickup truck without losing his civilian status under IHL.
Furthermore, the idea of “membership” in an organization cannot be established
simply through affiliations, family ties, or mere association; within the context of
IHL, the term “combatants” refers only to members of a transnational group’s
121
armed forces. In other words, a web developer for Al-Qaeda is most likely not
a “combatant” consistent with a strict reading of IHL; a suicide bomber,
however, is.
According to the ICRC:
For the practical purposes of the principle of distinction, therefore,
membership in such groups cannot depend on abstract affiliation, family
ties, or other criteria prone to error, arbitrariness or abuse. Instead,
membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed
by an individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group
as a whole, namely the conduct of hostilities on behalf of a non-state
party to the conflict. Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for
individual membership in an organized armed group is whether a person
assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or her direct
122
participation in hostilities (hereafter: “continuous combat function”).
Worth noting again is the repeated use of words like “function” and “act.” In
other words, there must be an action, and it must contribute to a continuous role
in the group. The Obama administration’s insistence that a person in physical
proximity to terrorists is a combatant is therefore not necessarily in compliance
123
with international law. However, this method of counting casualties may

117. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.
html?pagewanted=3&_r=3&hp.
118. MELZER, supra note 105, at 44.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 33.
122. Id.
123. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 83.
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explain the administration’s low tally of civilian deaths. As recently as 2011,
Obama advisor and CIA director appointee John Brennan said “not a single
124
noncombatant had been killed in a year of strikes.” On another occasion, an
unnamed senior administration official told the New York Times that the number
of civilians killed in drone strikes in Pakistan under the Obama administration
was in the “single digits” and that any claims otherwise were “propaganda” from
125
“militants.”
Colonel William Tart, a manager of drone operations at Creech Air Force
Base in Nevada, claimed that he never saw a civilian casualty in his two years
with the program, insisting inter alia that drone pilots are privy to such detailed
126
information that mistakes rarely occur.
The MQ-9, an unstaffed aerial vehicle capable of carrying up to four
HELLFIRE missiles and a pair of 500-pound laser-guided bombs, is equipped
with an infrared camera that enables the operator to “see some[one] smoking a
127
cigarette from about 25,000 feet.” In certain regions of Pakistan, drones gather
surveillance data constantly. According to a man who lost his cousin in a drone
strike, “when the weather is clear, three or four [drones] can be seen . . . . They
128
are in the air 24 [hours a day], seven [days a week], but not when it’s raining.”
This constant level of drone surveillance through high-powered, infrared
cameras allows drone operators to watch private activities such as spousal
intimacy, parents playing with their children, and family members mourning at a
129
funeral. Drone operators, Colonel Tart explained, become extremely familiar
with the lives of people in a strike zone: “[w]e watch people for months. We see
them playing with their dogs or doing their laundry. We know their patterns like
130
we know our neighbors’ patterns. We even go to their funerals.”
Even so, an official speaking to the New York Times noted that the use of a
“signature”, which in theory should map onto behavior consistent with terrorism,
or at least, with combatancy, often accidentally conflates civilians with
combatants: “[i]t bothers me when they say there were seven guys, so they must
all be militants. They count the corpses and they’re not really sure who they
131
are.” Others—also from the State Department, also speaking to the New York
Times on condition of anonymity—complain that when the CIA sees “three guys

124. Becker & Shane, supra note 117.
125. Id.
126. Nicola Abé, Dreams in Infrared: The Woes of an American Drone Operator, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec.
14, 2012, 5:03 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/pain-continues-after-war-for-american-dronepilot-a-872726.html.
127. David Piper, Trim Reaper: Streamlined Killer Drone Begins Combat Operations in Iraq, FOX NEWS
(July 24, 2008), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,389962,00.html.
128. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 150.
129. See generally Abé, supra note 126.
130. Id.
131. Becker & Shane, supra note 117.
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doing jumping jacks,” the agency thinks they are witnessing some sort of a
132
terrorist training camp.
There is little public information about what kinds of behavior are
sufficiently suspicious to merit a signature strike. Still, it can be inferred from a
combination of confidential information leaks and investigative reporting that the
“signature” of a potential militant or terrorist is defined very broadly. Once again,
it bears mentioning that “terrorist” and “militant” are political terms with no
grounding in IHL: in IHL, a person is either a combatant or civilian, and there is
133
no such thing as a “militant” or a “terrorist.” The “signature” of a terrorist or
militant, therefore, may not be consistent with the “signature” of a combatant
134
simply because “combatant” and “terrorist/militant” are not synonyms.
Of course, this may be a feature, rather than a bug, of the signature strike
program, which may be in place to snuff out militants and terrorists rather than
snuff out combatants. It should also be noted that in addition to “signature
strikes,” drone operators may use “personality strikes,” which refers to strikes
135
targeting known terrorists or known members of Al-Qaeda. Signature strikes,
136
on the other hand, target persons who act like they are Al-Qaeda. This, of
course, assumes that a person who acts like Al-Qaeda is Al-Qaeda. However, in
some communities there may not be a significant difference between the day-today behavior of Al-Qaeda and the day-to-day behavior of a civilian. In some
strike zones, “fighters regularly intermingle with civilians . . . and do not wear
137
uniforms,” and signature strike operators have conflated otherwise normal
behavior with suspicious behavior on several occasions, targeting people who
were carrying weapons, were present in a location identified as a militant
138
compound, or were traveling in a convoy of vehicles. Individuals have also
been targeted for driving a suspicious vehicle, spending time in or around certain
139
facilities, or operating certain types of communications equipment.
One Pakistani community elder tried to explain the types of everyday,
commonplace activities that would lead to drone strikes:
[T]hese attacks have been on schools, on maliks, on elders, and on
different buildings . . . [S]ometimes when people are moving in cars,
they are hit. Sometimes when they are gathering with friends, they are
132. Id.
133. See MELZER, supra note 105, at 44.
134. See generally ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, ICRC, WHAT IS
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? (July 2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
what_is_ihl.pdf.
135. Becker & Shane, supra note 117.
136. See generally Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes, N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb 22, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/22/washington/22policy.html?_r=0.
137. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 112.
138. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 33, 41.
139. Id. at 33.
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hit. Sometimes when people are gathering to offer prayers to those killed,
there are drone attacks on those people . . . [M]y own relatives, close
family relatives, have been killed. Elders of the villages, the maliks, the
children of the schools, other children, all have been victims of strikes.
[In one case,] [t]here was a drone attack on a religious teacher while he
was coming in a car with some other people, after which he was brought
to the village. A lot of people were gathering, the small children and
families were gathered, and another drone attack happened, killing the
140
small children. Two drone attacks in a single day.
None of these activities, however, automatically equate to direct
participation, nor turn a civilian into a person with a continuous combat
141
function. Nor do they even rise to the level of indirect participation even under
a liberal reading of IHL, given that they do not seem to contribute even indirectly
142
to the success of enemy forces. To be sure, the fact that Taliban and Al-Qaeda
fighters mingle regularly with civilian populations certainly poses challenges to
143
drone operators and their commanders. However, IHL nonetheless dictates that
militaries engaged in an armed conflict must always attempt to distinguish
144
between legitimate and illegitimate targets for an attack.
Given that such a wide scope of activities exposes individuals to being
targeted by a drone strike, (assuming, of course, that oral reports from FATA can
be taken at face value) it is possible that a suspicious “signature” has been
defined so broadly, and the definition of imminence expanded so greatly, that it
serves as poor proxy for direct participation or continuous combat function.
Alternatively, it can be concluded that the problem is not one of broadness,
but of cultural context: suspicious behavior in the United States may not be
suspicious in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Yemen. A drone operator launching
missiles from a control room hundreds or thousands of miles away may be
unable to contextualize what he is seeing or why he is seeing it, leading him to
conflate normal behavior with suspicious activity.
Although the amount and quality of cultural training drone pilots are exposed
to is not made explicit, the Air Force discloses that newly recruited drone pilots
145
are subjected to a four week, drone-specific training regimen. During the
course of this training, each recruit is exposed to “strict instructions on rules of
engagement, ‘and on when and how [to] employ ordnance’” combined with

140. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 152.
141. See supra Part V.
142. See supra Part V.
143. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 112.
144. ICRC, BASIC RULES OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (1988),
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0365.pdf.
145. Anna Mulrine, UAV Pilots, AIR FORCE MAGAZINE, Jan. 2009, at 34, 36, available at http://www.
airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/January%202009/0109UAV.aspx.
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146

training from soldiers in combat zones. The purpose of this training is to help
them cultivate an awareness of friendly locations and strategies for positively
147
identifying targets. Although the training schedule is not disclosed to the public,
the short period of training suggests that operators may not be heavily exposed to
the normative cultural, ethnic, and religious practices common to the targeted
country. Therefore, the most conservative application of signature strike protocol
may not enable a drone operator to accurately interpret what is being seen, or
understand why people are acting suspiciously, even if he has the best of
148
intentions and a sincerely held interest in following IHL.
Signature strike protocol, therefore, not only risks violating the mandate to
distinguish, but also the mandate to exercise proportionality, which will be
discussed in the next section.
VI. DO SIGNATURE STRIKES VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY?
Proportionality is a critical component of IHL, and refers to the notion that
an attack “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, [and] which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
149
anticipated, is prohibited.” Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I
prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
150
advantage anticipated.”
While Additional Protocol II does not contain an explicit reference to the
151
principle of proportionality in attack, it has been argued that it “is inherent in
152
the principle of humanity” explicitly applicable to the Protocol in the preamble,
and additionally, has been included in the Amended Protocol II to the
153
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and is therefore relevant to
non-international armed conflicts. For example, according to the U.S. Naval
Handbook, “[i]t is not unlawful to cause incidental injury to civilians, or
collateral damage to civilian objects, during an attack upon a legitimate military
objective. Incidental injury or collateral damage must not, however, be excessive

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra Part V.
149. Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC CUSTOMARY IHL, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/
docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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in light of the military advantage anticipated by the attack.” The fact that drone
strike protocol seems unable to take cultural context into account, however, may
have lead to several disproportionate attacks on civilians in violation of IHL.
For example, tribal elders hold a position in Pushtun culture that is difficult
for the average American to appreciate. “Pushtunwali,” a Pushtun socio-legal
system found in Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a series of local and cultural
155
practices that regulate behavior and maintain social order. Pushtunwali, among
other things, obligates a villager to open his home to tribal elders, including those
156
that the United States has designated as “militants” or “terrorists.” In
homosocial societies like Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is also possible that a tribal
leader would meet with military-aged men for reasons other than to “plan or
157
conduct attacks, regroup for future hostilities, [or] train.” As Waziristan
resident Daud Khan explained, “all the local people must offer [the Taliban]
158
food” and, if they stop by, it is impossible to turn them away. Cultural practices
such as this may lead drone operators to conclude civilians are part of the
Taliban, when in fact they are simply bound to offer them hospitality as dictated
by Pushtunwali.
The inability to contextualize commonplace social gatherings within their
proper cultural frame has led on occasion to a disproportionate amount of civilian
deaths. On one occasion, a signature strike was executed against a heavily armed
group that was believed to be “act[ing] in a manner consistent with [Al-Qaeda]159
linked militants” and included men “connected to Al-Qaeda.” After executing
the strike, the United States claimed it had killed twenty “militants”; however,
community members and Pakistani officials said that the missiles had struck a
160
“jirga”—a type of meeting held to resolve local disputes. Such a meeting
requires the presence of high-ranking tribal officials, some of whom are Taliban,
161
in order for the resolution to have any legitimacy. In the end, it turned out that
only four Taliban were present and killed at the meeting because any resolution
162
to the dispute would have lacked binding authority absent their approval. The

154. THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS & HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSP.,
AND U.S. COAST GUARD § 8.1.2.1 (1995).
155. MARINE CORPS INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY, CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS:
PASHTUNS IN AFGHANISTAN 1, available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/MCIA-AfghanCultures/Pashtuns.
pdf.
156. See id. at 24.
157. Vogel, supra note 116, at 122.
158. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 42.
159. Scott Shane, Contrasting Reports of Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12droneside.html; LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 57, n.283.
160. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 34.
161. DONALD P. WRIGHT ET AL., A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION
ENDURING FREEDOM OCTOBER 2001-SEPTEMBER 2005 11 (2010).
162. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 34.
OF THE
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rest of the dead included thirty-eight civilians, one of which was Daud Khan’s
163
son. Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, issued a statement
saying “[the] tribal elders had been ‘carelessly and callously targeted with
164
complete disregard to human life.”
Western misunderstanding of Pakistani morés surrounding hospitality may
also inadvertently fuel claims that Al-Qaeda intermix with civilian populations to
165
use them as shields, and that a Taliban fighter will “purposefully obfuscate his
belligerent status by posing as a civilian—and in many cases targets civilians and
conducts operations in civilian settings. Al-Qaeda and its associates also
166
routinely use protected persons and objects as shields.”
Along these lines, Ryan J. Vogel, foreign affairs specialist for the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, invites consideration of the fact that our “foes gather in
167
civilian settings, such as homes and boarding houses.” His conclusion
highlights the many cultural and contextual obstacles that inform signature strike
policy, as well as its current execution in South Asia and the Middle East:
There is no doubt that a person’s residence is civilian in status, but when
the home is used to house belligerents, store weapons, plan or conduct
attacks, regroup for future hostilities, train, or any number of other
activities that make an effective contribution to the war effort, that
home’s nature, location, purpose, or use arguably changes in such a way
that it forfeits its protected civilian status and becomes a military
168
objective.
First, it should be noted that according to Article 50 of Protocol I, the
presence of non-civilians within a civilian area does not automatically transform
the area into a military object, and civilians conducting business with members of
169
the armed forces do not automatically lose their civilian status. His argument,
however, is that the house may be used to shelter “belligerents,” thus
170
transforming the character of the house under IHL. Of course, “belligerents”
are not a recognized category of persons under IHL; in the world of IHL, there

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in
Pakistan, 19 J. TRANS. NAT’L L. & POL’Y 237, 276 (2009).
166. Vogel, supra note 116, at 117.
167. Id. at 122.
168. Id.
169. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=E1F8F99C4C3F8FE4C12563CD00
51DC8A [hereinafter Geneva Protocol I].
170. Vogel, supra note 116, at 122.
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are “combatants” and “civilians.” “Belligerent,” like “militant,” is a political
category that has no meaning in the laws of war. If a house is used to shelter
“combatants,” it may lose its civilian status, given, as aforementioned, that
172
combatants are vulnerable to lethal force at any time. But if a house is used to
shelter “belligerents,” its status is less clear. This fictional home may also remain
173
“civilian” in status even if it hosts men who “regroup” for future hostilities.
Who is doing the regrouping? Fighters who need to rest before launching another
attack or construction workers who are preparing to repair damaged civilian
infrastructure? Without knowing who exactly is regrouping, from what they are
regrouping, and why, it is difficult to comment on the legality of using lethal
force under IHL.
Even if we discard Article 50 of Protocol I and take Vogel’s arguments at
face value, it is important to consider that he does not present these hypotheticals
174
within the framework of Pushtunwali. In so doing, he fails to consider that a
gathering where Taliban fighters are present can take place for the purposes of
non-military objectives and can include people who are not a part of the Taliban,
as well as any gathering of “military-aged” men, particularly in homosocial
societies such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan.
The fact that a location is used for storing weapons, which, to Vogel, means
175
that a civilian object has been turned into a military one, is also contextually
dependent. Given the prevalence of guns and gun culture in Central Asia and the
176
Middle East, weapons storage may not be an accurate proxy for direct
participation, or even for establishing “continuous combat function” as per the
177
language of Article 51(3).
178
Pakistan ranks sixth in the world in terms of per capita gun ownership, with
11.6% of the civilian population armed with 18 million total small arms in
179
civilian hands. Iraq is the fifth most armed country in the world, with
180
approximately thirty-five guns per hundred people. In Yemen, where gun
ownership is similarly part of local culture, government officials have expressed

171. See Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, supra note 149.
172. Kennedy, supra note 99.
173. See Geneva Protocol I, supra note 169.
174. See Vogel, supra note 116, at 122.
175. Id.
176. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. & REG’L HUMAN SEC. CTR., TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PRACTICES
AND SMALL ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 14 (2002), available at http://www.quno.
org/geneva/pdf/disarmament-peace/amman_seminar_report.pdf.
177. MELZER, supra note 105, at 16; AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. & REG’L HUMAN SEC. CTR., supra note
176, at 14.
178. Laura MacInnis, U.S. Most Armed Country With 90 Guns per 100 People, REUTERS, (Aug. 28,
2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/28/us-world-firearms-idUSL2834893820070828.
179. Simon Rogers, Gun Homicides and Gun Ownership Listed by Country, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2010,
8:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/jul/22/gun-homicides-ownership-world-list.
180. MacInnis, supra note 178.
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reservations that the presence of weapons can serve as a reasonable proxy for
181
direct participation or for “militant” activity. “Every Yemeni is armed,” said
one Yemeni official, “so how can they differentiate between suspected militants
182
and armed Yemenis?” It is not an exaggeration to characterize “every Yemeni”
as armed; Yemen has the second most guns per person out of every country on
183
Earth with 54.8 guns for every hundred Yemenis. The United States,
meanwhile, is the only country with more per capita privately owned guns than
184
Yemen, with 88.8 guns for every hundred civilians. “Storing weapons” may
indicate that a house is used for military purposes; however, depending on the
cultural context in which it occurs, it may not.
The prevalence of weapons in places like Yemen also makes it difficult to
count the number of civilian casualties. Not only are many military-aged male
185
non-combatants armed (much like in the United States), but confusion is
further compounded by the Yemeni government’s active obfuscation of the
number of civilian deaths:
A rickety Toyota truck packed with 14 people rumbled down a desert
road from the town of Radda, which Al-Qaeda militants once
controlled. Suddenly a missile hurtled from the sky and flipped the
vehicle over. Chaos. Flames. Corpses. Then, a second missile struck.
Within seconds, 11 of the passengers were dead, including a woman and
her 7-year-old daughter. A 12-year-old boy also perished that day, and
another man later died from his wounds. The Yemeni government
initially said that those killed were Al-Qaeda militants and that its
Soviet-era jets had carried out the September 2nd attack. But tribal
leaders and Yemeni officials would later say that it was an American
assault and that all the victims were civilians who lived in a village near
Radda, in central Yemen. U.S. officials last week acknowledged for the
first time that it was an American strike. “Their bodies were burning,”
recalled Sultan Ahmed Mohammed, 27, who was riding on the hood of
the truck and flew headfirst into a sandy expanse. “How could this
186
happen? None of us were Al-Qaeda.”

181. CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 33.
182. Adam Entous et al., U.S. Relaxes Drone Rules: Obama Gives CIA, Military Greater Leeway in Use
Against Militants in Yemen, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 26, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405
2702304723304577366251852418174.html.
183. Rogers, supra note 179.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Sudarsan Raghavan, When U.S. Drones Kill Civilians, Yemen’s Government Tries To Conceal It, WASH. POST
(Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/when-us-drones-kill-civilians-yemens-governmenttries-to-conceal-it/2012/12/24/bd4d7ac2-486d-11e2-8af9-9b50cb4605a7_story.html.
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On one hand, it can be argued that this incident, like those in Pakistan, may
have happened due to a misunderstanding of Yemeni culture. Perhaps mistakes
like these would become infrequent if drone operators were given exposure to
Yemeni or Pakistani behavior, culture, and customs, and had on-the-ground
personnel approving drone strikes.
On the other hand, drone strikes in Afghanistan “are ordered by a local
187
commander, [and] overseen by military lawyers,” and Americans have had an
ongoing presence for over a decade. There have nonetheless been culturallydriven misunderstandings and misinterpretations resulting in civilian deaths. On
one occasion, a group that included military age men decided to travel in a
188
convoy through an insurgent stronghold for safety purposes.
From the surveillance of a Predator, US forces came to believe that the group
was Taliban. As described by [a U.S.] Army officer who was involved: “[w]e all
had it in our head, ‘[h]ey, why do you have 20 military age males at 5 a.m.
collecting each other?’ . . . . There can be only one reason, and that’s because
we’ve put [U.S. troops] in the area.” The US forces proceeded to interpret the
unfolding events in accordance with their belief that the convoy was full of
insurgents. Evidence of the presence of children became evidence of
“adolescents,” unconfirmed suspicions of the presence of weapons turned into an
assumption of their presence. The United States fired on the convoy, killing
189
twenty-three people.
Signature strike protocol and its inability to properly distinguish between
190
civilians and combatants, therefore, may lead to violations of proportionality,
but so too might the unpredictable character of signature strike protocol itself due
191
to the stress it inflicts on civilian populations. A common thread in interviews
with Waziristan residents is a fear of the inherently uncertain and unpredictable
192
nature of drone strikes. This fear has paralyzed entire communities, leading
people to stop going to work, attending school, shopping at the market, or
193
gathering in large groups. According to one man whose brother died in a drone
strike:
[“Before, e]verybody was involved in their [sic] own labor work. We
were all busy. But since the drone attacks have started, everybody is very
scared and everybody is terrorized . . . People are out of business, people
are out of schools, because people are being killed by these drone

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Shachtman, supra note 80.
CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 42.
Id.
LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 151.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 149.
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attacks.” Tahir emphasized, “It’s not a [fictional] story. It’s brutality that
194
we are undergoing and that needs to be stopped.”
The uncertainty of signature strike protocol may violate the principle of
proportionality, given that the general rules of IHL were developed to “protect
195
civilians from the effects of hostilities” and “limit the damage and provide care
196
for the casualties.” The Red Cross suggests that the infliction of psychological
trauma on civilians constitutes “[a] lack of respect shown by weapons bearers
and their political operatives” for their obligations under IHL: “[t]he right to life,
respect for family unity, and respect for dignity and physical and psychological
197
integrity [which] are central to these obligations.” This suggests that the
mandate to distinguish and use proportionality extends beyond the use of lethal
force, armed attacks, or a strict reading of Article 52(2), and includes activities
that inflict psychological trauma on civilians.
The ICRC also acknowledges, however, that the law remains underdeveloped
in this regard: the extent to which force can be used for purely psychological
purposes, such as shutting down a civilian radio station for the sole purpose of
undermining the morale of the civilian population, is an issue that has yet to be
198
addressed authoritatively by the international community. Furthermore, there is
no evidence that drone strike protocol operates with the intention of inciting
199
terror among the civilian population. However, according to a Pakistani
community elder:
“We know that the consequences of drone strikes are extremely harsh.
Our children, our wives know that our breadwinners, when they go out to
earn a livelihood, they might not come back, and life may become very
miserable for them in the years to come.” Khalid further explained,
“Now we are always awaiting a drone attack and we know it’s certain
and it’s eventual and it will strike us, and we’re just waiting to hear
whose house it will strike, our relatives’, our neighbors’, or us. We do
200
not know. We’re just always in fear.”

194. Id.
195. Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, President, ICRC, Keynote Address at the 34th Round Table on Current
Issues of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Sept. 8-10 2011, available at http://www.icrc
.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-08.htm.
196. Knut Dörmann, Computer Network Attack and International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (May 19,
2001), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/5p2alj.htm.
197. Protection of the Civilian Population, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/what-wedo/protecting-civilians/overview-protection-civilian-population.htm.
198. Dörmann, supra note 196.
199. See generally id.
200. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 151.
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VII. ARGUMENTS FOR DRONES: “ACCURACY,” “PRECISION,”
AND OPERATORS’ MENTAL HEALTH
It should by this point be clear that signature drone strikes raise many
uncomfortable issues and may violate IHL mandates regarding proportionality as
201
well as the need to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Nevertheless,
there are still many drone advocates and plenty of arguments advanced in favor
of using drone technology, much of which revolves around drones’ purported
adherence to the laws of war. For example, Andrew C. Orr, while admitting that
civilian casualties pose legal challenges to the framework of IHL, states that:
Targeted killing of Al-Qaeda fighters is permissible under Article 3,
which applies protections to “persons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat” . . . The drones do not attack
such persons, instead targeting only Al-Qaeda fighters, which is
202
permissible during an armed conflict.
Michael W. Lewis, professor at the Petit College of Law at Ohio Northern
University, makes a similar argument, writing:
The longer loiter time of drones allows for a much higher level of
confidence that the target has been properly identified . . . Even if the
drone is evading fire at the time of weapons release, those making the
final decision to carry out the attack are not dealing with the decisionimpairing effects of mortal fear. Although the sanitary environment of
the drone control room has been criticized for making war too much like
a video game, it undoubtedly leads to much sounder proportionality
203
determinations.
And finally, Bradley J. Strawser of the University of Connecticut, writing in
the Journal of Military Ethics, claims:
Recent studies bear out that UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones]
appear to have, in fact, greater technical capabilities at making
determinations of combatant status. Avery Plaw (2010) has recently
compiled a database combining reports from a variety of sources on the
results of United States UAV attacks carried out in Pakistan from 2004 to
2007. This data shows that UAV strikes were far better at noncombatant
201. See supra Part VI.
202. Andrew C. Orr, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The Status of American Drone Strikes
in Pakistan Under International Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 729, 744 (2011).
203. Michael L. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 293, 297-98
(2012).
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discrimination than all other methods used for engaging Taliban fighters
in the region. For example, the UAV strikes resulted in a ratio of over 17
to 1 of intended militant targets to civilian deaths compared with a 4 to 1
ratio for Pakistan Special Weapons and Tactics Teams team offensives or
a nearly 3 to 1 for Pakistan Army operations in the same region during
the same time period. Or, compare the 17 to 1 ratio for the UAV
employment to the shocking 0.125 to 1 militant to civilian casualty ratio
estimate for all armed conflict worldwide for the year 2000 (Plaw 2010).
If these numbers are even close to accurate, it seems that there is strong
evidence which directly contradicts the central premise of objection 1.
204
That is, UAVs are better, not worse, at noncombatant discrimination.
This Article does not attempt to single out these men’s views as particularly
egregious or shocking. It also does not attempt to suggest that their respective
publications are informed by a casual attitude toward civilian death and suffering,
nor does it suggest that drone operators themselves are unaware or unconcerned
with the ethical implications of drone strikes: a 2011 report commissioned by the
Department of Defense stated that 17% of drone pilots show signs of “clinical
distress” due in part to the trauma of “pressing a button that can lead to
205
someone’s death half a world away.” The report also referred to high operation
stress due to a shortage of qualified drone operators, long and odd hours, short
206
staffing, and monotony, which in combination led to fatigue and “burnout.”
The quotes from the authors above are included because they are good examples
of common, pro-drone-strike arguments held by scholars, political commentators,
207
and military officials alike. However, it is pertinent to note that other law
professors and legal commentators are similarly interested in drones’ purported
ability to minimize injury and psychological trauma to American forces and
208
effectively carry out missions against Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
209
That all said, these arguments do not necessarily rest on stable ground.
First, the targeted killing of Al-Qaeda members who have a continuous combat
210
function is generally permissible under IHL. But, as discussed at length, Al211
Qaeda fighters are not the only people targeted by drone strikes. A study by
Stanford Law School and New York University’s School of Law concluded the
204. Bradley Jay Strawser, Moral Predators: The Duty to Employ Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, 9 J. OF
MILITARY ETHICS 342, 352 (2010).
205. Phil Stewart, Overstretched U.S. Drone Pilots Face Stress Risk, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2011, 5:41 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/18-usa-drones-stress-id.
206. Jeremy Herb, Air Force Study Finds Drone Pilots Face High Stress, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2011, 10:54
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/air-force/200405-air-force-study-finds-drone-pilots-face-high-stress.
207. See supra Part VII.
208. See generally Orr, supra note 202; see generally Lewis, supra note 203.
209. See infra Part VII.
210. See LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 150.
211. See supra Part VI.
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number of “high-level” targets killed as a percentage of total casualties was
212
extremely low, about two-percent. The militant-to-target ratio, furthermore, is
difficult to verify given that military-aged males in the strike zone are often
213
counted as “militants;” so too are affiliates of Al-Qaeda or the Taliban. It is,
however, clear from witness statements, as well as from statements made by
drone operators themselves, that the signature strike protocol has led to the
deaths of civilians, including women and children: “I saw men, women and
children die . . . . I never thought I would kill that many people. In fact, I thought
214
I couldn’t kill anyone at all,” Brandon Bryant, a former drone operator with the
215
U.S. Air Force, told Der Spiegel. On one occasion, in October of 2010, sixtynine children were killed when a drone strike hit a religious seminary in
216
Chenegai, in Bajaur Agency. The target was apparently the headmaster, who
217
was a “known militant.” The Pakistan army initially took responsibility for the
strike, and it is still not clear why the school was targeted when so many children
218
were inside it. It is therefore difficult to claim that drones are inherently more
219
likely to adhere to IHL by virtue of their enhanced technical capabilities.
Second, “the longer loiter time of drones” which, according to Professor
Lewis, “allows for a much higher level of confidence that the target has been
220
properly identified,” does not speak to the criteria for properly identifying
221
appropriate targets. According to comments made by an anonymous official to
the Washington Post in 2011, for example, two times as many “wanted terrorists”
have been killed by the United States in signature strikes than in personality
222
strikes. Additionally, those individuals on the kill list have been killed by a
223
signature strike “when the [CIA] didn’t know they were there.”
Of course, if the definition of a militant’s “signature” reliably and
consistently overlapped with IHL’s definition of “direct participation” or
“continuous combat function,” Professor Lewis would have a point. However, as
discussed, there are indications that that a “signature” is not a reliable proxy for
224
distinction. A drone may be able to hit its target with more accuracy than a
212. Tahir Khan, US Drones Traumatising Tribal Children, EXPRESS TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/481473/us-drones-traumatising-tribal-children/.
213. See Woods, supra note 114.
214. Abé, supra note 126.
215. Id.
216. Chris Woods, The Day 69 Children Died, EXPRESS TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/
story/229844/the-day-69-children-died/.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See supra Part VI.
220. Lewis, supra note 203.
221. See CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES, supra note 79, at 9.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See Drones, supra note 1.
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225

traditional, staffed aircraft; however, the target itself may not be a legal one
226
under IHL.
Supporters of drone strikes also frequently tout the “accuracy” of drones,
227
arguing that they are an ideal weapon for minimizing civilian casualties. Vogel
writes:
With their ability to surveil for hours or days at a time, and to perform
surgical strikes with pinpoint accuracy, drones typically offer a cleaner
alternative to other forms of aerial bombardment or missile strikes. P.W.
Singer writes that “[u]nmanned systems seem to offer several ways of
reducing the mistakes and unintended costs of war,” including by using
“far better sensors and processing power . . . allow[ing] decisions to be
made in a more deliberate manner,” and “remov[ing] the anger and
emotion from the humans behind them.” “Such exactness,” Singer
argues, “can lessen the number of mistakes made, as well as the number
of civilians inadvertently killed.” Senior U.S. officials have consistently
stated that “procedures and practices for identifying lawful targets” in the
AUMF conflict “are extremely robust, and advanced technologies have
228
helped to make our targeting even more precise.”
By and large, the mainstream media have agreed with this narrative,
229
characterizing drones as offering “pinpoint accuracy” in the field. Again, as it
is difficult to know exactly how many civilians have been killed in drone strikes,
it is difficult to assess the veracity of claims regarding drones’ target finding
230
capabilities. Counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated in 2011 that “there
231
hasn’t been a single collateral death,” but in April of 2013, Brennan admitted:
“[civilians] have been accidentally injured, or worse, killed in these strikes. It is

225. U.S. Drone Strikes More Deadly to Afghan Civilians Than Manned Aircraft, WAR IN CONTEXT (July
3, 2013), http://warincontext.org/2013/07/03/u-s-drone-strikes-more-deadly-to-afghan-civilians-than-mannedaircraft/.
226. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8, at 150.
227. Vogel, supra note 116, at 102.
228. Id.
229. See Flight of the Drones: Why the Future of Air Power Belongs to Unmanned Systems, ECONOMIST
(Oct. 8, 2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/21531433; see also NOVA: Rise of the Drones,
KPBS, http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/jan/22/nova-rise-drones/ (last updated Mar. 15, 2013, 10:56 AM); see
also Denis D. Gray, New Role for Drones—Wildlife, Eco-conservation, YAHOO! NEWS (Aug. 19, 2012, 2:19
AM), http://news.yahoo.com/role-drones-wildlife-eco-conservation-06072 7498.html; see also Max Hastings,
We’ll Need Great Courage to Tackle This Deadly New Face of Terror, MAIL ONLINE, http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article-2264819/MAX-HASTINGS-Well-need-great-courage-tackle-deadly-new-faceterror.html?ito=feeds-newsxml (last updated Jan. 20, 2013, 7:07 PM).
230. See Raghavan, supra note 186 (stating that the government often tries to conceal civilian deaths from
the public, fearing rebellion if hostility toward U.S. policies increases even more).
231. Peter Bergen & Jennifer Rowland, New View of Drone Death Toll, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/
07/26/opinion/bergen-pakistan-drone-debate (last updated July 26, 2013, 3:33 PM).
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exceedingly rare, but it has happened. When it does, it pains us, and we regret it
232
deeply, as we do any time innocents are killed in war.”
Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, has disputed the latter assertion,
saying that only 20% of drone strike victims are in fact militants, and the rest are
233
civilians. A leaked Pakistani government document puts the number of civilian
deaths far lower than Rehman Malik’s 80% but far higher than Brennan’s
assertion of 0%, finding that 20% of the people killed between 2006 and 2009
234
were civilians.
Whatever the real civilian death toll, “surgical strike,” like “pinpoint
accuracy,” is a term with no real substance and no connection to observable or
235
measurable data. It has never been seriously claimed that a drone can fire a
HELLFIRE missile at a pin from 15,000 feet and hit it with any degree of
consistency. These terms—“surgical strike” and “pinpoint accuracy”—therefore
either do not mean anything concrete and do not tell us anything useful, or
alternatively, are to be taken at face value and are plainly wrong.
Furthermore, “accuracy” and “precision” are not synonyms: it is possible for
236
a weapon to be accurate but not precise, or precise but not accurate.
237
“Accuracy” describes the closeness of a drone strike to its chosen target.
“Precision” refers to how close drone strikes fall to each other when aimed at a
238
single target. For example, if five HELLFIRE missiles are launched one after
the other and all fall on the same spot, the HELLFIRE missile can be called
239
“precise.” If that spot, however, is nowhere near the designated target, the
240
HELLFIRE missiles are not “accurate.” If the HELLFIRE missile in this
scenario truly is both accurate and precise, all five missiles would form a tight
241
cluster around the designated target.
Unfortunately, the HELLFIRE missile may be neither accurate nor precise,
242
as suggested by a Pentagon report on the AGM-114 HELLFIRE missile.
Developed in the 1970s, the HELLFIRE is designed to defeat tanks “and other

232. Drone Strikes Kill, supra note 1.
233. See Bergen & Rowland, supra note 231.
234. Id.
235. See supra Part VII.
236. See Benjamin Shotzberger, Precision vs. Accuracy, AMERICAN RIFLEMAN (Apr. 30, 2013),
http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/precision-vs-accuracy/.
237. See id.
238. Accuracy Versus Precision, NOAA CELEBRATES 200 YEARS OF SCI, SERVICE, & STEWARDSHIP,
http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/magazine/tct/tct_side1.html (last updated July 19, 2012). See also
Shotzberger, supra note 236.
239. See Shotzberger, supra note 236.
240. See id.
241. Id.
242. See Matthew J. Nasuti, HELLFIRE Missile Accuracy Problems Uncovered in Pentagon Data:
Official Claims of “Pinpoint” Accuracy Are Exaggerated, KABULPRESS.ORG (Nov. 27, 2011), http://
kabulpress.org/my/spip.php?article89242.
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243

individual targets” and “hosts precision kill technology against high-value
244
armour, air defense, ship, waterborne, and non-moving targets.” An archived
U.S. Navy Fact File page from 2002 describes it in similar terms, highlighting its
efficiency in destroying tanks, helicopters, and slow-moving aircraft:
HELLFIRE can be used as an air-to-air or an air-to-ground missile. The
Air-to-Ground (AGM)-114 provides precision striking power against
tanks, structures, bunkers and helicopters. The HELLFIRE missile is
capable of defeating any known tank in the world today. It can be guided
to the target either from inside the aircraft or by lasers outside the
245
aircraft.
The most recent upgrade, the Romeo II, is tested on stationary targets sitting
in the open in a flat test range at an Air Force base in Florida and is yielding
246
inflated numbers regarding both the accuracy and precision of the weapon. The
Brookings Institution estimated in a 2009 report that a HELLFIRE missile killed
247
ten civilians for each “militant.” This could serve either as an indictment of
signature strike protocol or alternatively suggest that the HELLFIRE (which, was
originally designed for engagement with tanks and tank-sized targets) is not
248
“pinpoint accurate” when fired at humans.
The “double tap,” wherein the drone operator fires at an intended target, and
then at rescuers offering assistance to any survivors, may have in fact been
initiated at the suggestion of Lockheed-Martin as a way to compensate for the
249
inaccuracy of HELLFIRE missiles. In the “double tap” method, missiles strike
the initial target, and then strike rescuers and medical personnel who arrive at the
250
scene to offer assistance. According to a recent report that makes use of on-theground investigative reporting and eye-witness interviews, the double-tap has
been used with growing frequency in Afghanistan and Pakistan to the point that
251
“almost every other” strike in certain regions of Pakistan is a double tap.
243. BOEING, supra note 12.
244. HELLFIRE II Anti-Armour Missile, ARMED FORCES INT’L, http://www.armedforces-int.com/
projects/hellfire_ii_anti_armour_missile.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
245. U.S. NAVY, AGM-114B/K/M HELLFIRE MISSILE, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?
cid=2200&tid=400&ct=2 (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
246. Nasuti, supra note 242.
247. Derrick Crowe, Brookings Report on Drones Confirms High Civilian Death Rate and Misses the
Point, FIREDOGLAKE (July 21, 2009, 10:09 AM), http://my.firedoglake.com/derrickcrowe/2009/07/21/
brookings-report-on-drones-confirms-high-civilian-death-rate-and-misses-the-point/.
248. See Nasuti, supra note 242; see also Crowe, supra note 247.
249. Michael Kelley, More Evidence That Drones Are Targeting Civilian Rescuers In Afghanistan, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 25, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/drone-double-tap-first-responders-2012-9.
250. Id.
251. Jerome Taylor, Outrage at CIA’s Deadly ‘Double Tap’ Drone Attacks, THE INDEP. (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/outrage-at-cias-deadly-double-tap-drone-attacks8174771.html.
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The effect of the double tap on civilians has been profound. In addition to
253
adding to the mounting death toll of non-combatants, double taps have
essentially trained first responders not to assist or rescue drone strike victims and
to withhold emergency services and medical help from survivors:
A father of four, who lost one of his legs in a drone strike, admitted:
“[w]e and other people are so scared of drone attacks now that when
there is a drone strike, for two or three hours nobody goes close to [the
location of the strike]. We don’t know who [the victims] are, whether
254
they are young or old, because we try to be safe.”
At this point, it is not clear if the “double tap” falls under the umbrella of
255
signature strike protocol. It is, however, clear that the double tap violates
specific protections in place for the “sick, wounded . . . [and] others such as
medical and religious personnel, humanitarian workers, and civil defense
256
staff.” A 2007 Homeland Security Report referred to the double tap as a
257
“favorite tactic of Hamas” and one employed by “terrorists,” and Christof
Heyns, a U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, has characterized
258
drone strikes on first responders as a “war crime.”
Claims that the drone is an ideal weapon that is more humane due to its
“accuracy” and “precision” must therefore be subjected to scrutiny, given that the
259
facts on the ground seem to tell a very different story.
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
It should be clear at this point that “signatures” are not necessarily an
accurate proxy for determining direct participation consistent with IHL, and that
the problematic nature of signature strike protocol may lead to a disproportionate
260
number of civilian deaths. It should also be clear that the unpredictability of
signature drone strikes has put local civilian populations in a state of terror,
which may not be illegal under IHL, but certainly compromises the stated goal of
261
winning over hearts and minds.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See generally Other Protected Persons: Humanitarian Workers, Journalists, Medical and Religious
Personnel, ICRC (Oct. 29, 2010), http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/protected-persons/other-protected
persons/overview-other-protected-persons.htm.
256. Id.
257. Kelley, supra note 249.
258. LIVING UNDER DRONES, supra note 8.
259. See supra Part VII.
260. See supra Parts V-VII.
261. Letta Tayler, Losing Yemeni Hearts and Minds, SALON (May 31, 2012, 8:33 AM), http://www.
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We did not know that America existed. We did not know what its
geographical location was, how its government operated, what its
government was like, until America invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. We
do know that Americans supported the Taliban in our area, North
Waziristan, to fight off the Soviets. But [now with] the Soviets divided
and broken . . . we have become victims of Americans. We don’t know
how they treat their citizens or anything about them. All we know is that
they used to support us, and now they don’t. . . . [W]e didn’t know how
they treated a common man. Now we know how they treat a common
262
man, what they’re doing to us.
There are several possibilities that can explain the unpredictability of
263
The first is that signature strike protocol is
signature drone strikes.
264
underdeveloped, giving it an improvisatory and therefore unpredictable nature.
Drone operators and their supervisors may be left to their own devices to figure
out what behaviors merit the lethal use of force, and assessment of such
265
behaviors may vary from operator to operator, or even from shift to shift. The
risk, however, is that the improvisatory nature of such protocol becomes
codified: drone operators may conclude regularly that driving in convoy, for
266
example, is suspicious. Administration officials may then infer from the fact
that drone strikes have often killed military-aged males traveling in convoys that
267
terrorists or combatants are more likely than others to drive in a convoy. As
time passes, driving in a convoy may join an official list of behaviors deemed
268
suspicious.
Another possibility, however, is that the protocol itself is designed to target
terrorists rather than combatants, and that there is not enough of an overlap
269
between the two to effectively and consistently distinguish them. The overlap
between the day-to-day life of a terrorist and the day-to-day life of a civilian, as

salon.com/2012/05/31/losing_yemeni_hearts_and_mind/. See Kristi Keck, U.S. Must Win Afghan Hearts and
Minds, Commander Says, CNN (Sept. 28, 2009, 5:02 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-09-28/politics/
afghanistan.obama_1_new-strategy-additional-forces-afghan?_s=PM:POLITICS. See also Michael Georgy,
Drones Hurt Pakistan Bid to Win Hearts and Minds, REUTERS, Feb. 14, 2011, 9:09 AM, http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/0 2/14/us-pakistan-usa-drones-idUSTRE71D1DU20110214.
262. Victim Stories, LIVING UNDER DRONES, http://www.livingunderdrones.org/victim-stories/ (last
visited Oct. 29, 2013).
263. See supra Part VI.
264. See supra Part VI.
265. See supra Part VI.
266. See supra Part VI.
267. See supra Part VI.
268. See supra Part VI.
269. See supra Part V.
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noted, may be profound given that a drone operator is not privy to cultural
270
271
context. As a result, civilians are often mistakenly targeted.
This leads us to a final possibility, which is that signature strike protocol
conforms in theory with IHL, but in practice is difficult to apply due to cultural
272
misunderstandings. Drone operators and their supervisors may simply not be
exposed to enough cultural material to understand which practices are
commonplace in a given strike zone, and which are indeed suspicious, out of the
273
ordinary, or consistent with terrorists’ behavior.
Whatever the case, it is clear from eye-witness reports and on-the-ground
reporting that signature drone strike protocol requires revisiting and fine-tuning,
274
as it may be in violation of several aspects of IHL.

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

See supra Part V.
See supra Parts V-VIII.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part V.
See supra Parts III-VIII.
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